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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
PlaintiffyAppellee, * 
v. * Priority No. 2 
TODD MICHAEL MEDSKER, * Case No. 990266-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a sentence imposed after the Defendant plead guilty in the 
Second District Court of Morgan County to one count of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953, As Amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A §78-2a-2 (e) (1953, As Amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Committed Plain Error When it Failed to Strictly Comply with Rule 
11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in Taking the Defendant's Plea of Guilty. 
Standard of Review 
The question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional and 
procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) 
Citation to Record 
Despite Defendant's failure to move for a withdrawal of the plea of guilty, this 
court can review defendant's guilty pleas for plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d at 580. 
POINT II 
The Defendant Was Denied His Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel When His Attorney Advised Him to Plead Guilty to the Charges and When 
Counsel Failed to Move for Withdrawal of the Pleas When It was Obvious that the 
Defendant was Unable to Voluntarily Make Such a Plea. 
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Standard of Review 
Where ineffective assistance of Counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, the 
Appellate Court must determine as a matter of law whether the Defendant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. State v. Callahan, 866 P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993) 
Citation to the Record 
The Defendant alleges Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for the first time on 
appeal. The Appellate Court must determine as a matter of law whether the Defendant 
was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel even absent an 
objection in the trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUTES AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI —In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Amendment XIV. Section 1 - All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Article L Sec. 7 - No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
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Article 1. Sec. 12 - In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole 
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11(e) 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
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culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction entered after the defendant plead guilty to 
one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree felony in violation of 
U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 As Amended). On February 11, 1999, the trial Court sentenced 
Appellant to serve a term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, which term was 
suspended upon the completion of 120 days of home confinement and successful 
completion of probation. 
Mr. Medsker appeals his conviction and sentence based upon (1) the fact that the 
trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure in taking Defendant's plea; (2) the Defendant was denied his right to due 
process of law and effective assistance of counsel when his attorney erroneously advised 
him to plead guilty to the charge when it was obvious that he did not understand the 
charges against him; and (3) the Defendant was denied his right to due process of law and 
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effective assistance of counsel when his new counsel failed to file a motion to withdraw 
the plea and proceeded to sentencing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With citations to the Record1 
The Defendant, Todd Michael Medsker, was originally charged with Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, Possession of Paraphernalia and Driving Under the Influence. 
The charges arose after the Defendant was involved in an accident in which Defendant 
was life flighted to the Hospital for his injuries. Defendant sustained neurological 
injuries due to the accident. (Entry of Plea Pg. 4 & Sentencing Pg. 3) 
Prior to the preliminary hearing, it was brought to the Court's attention that a plea 
bargain had been made and Mr. Medsker would plead guilty to the third degree felony in 
exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. (Entry of Plea Pg. 2) 
Mr. Medsker5 s defense counsel at the time of the plea hearing, Michael J. Boyle, 
advised Mr. Medsker to plead guilty as indicated above. Despite Mr. Medsker's obvious 
confusion with the situation, the trial Court accepted his plea of guilty and set the matter 
for sentencing. (Entry of Plea Pg. 2-12) 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Medsker hired new counsel to assist him. Mr. Medsker's 
sentencing attorney, Glen A. Cook, failed to file a motion to withdraw Defendant's plea 
1
 The transcript of the trial court proceedings were improperly numbered; 
therefore, all citations to the record in relation to the trial court proceedings will be 
addressed by the heading indicated on the volume of the transcript and the page number 
as reflected on the transcript by the court reporter. 
-6-
of guilty and proceeded to sentencing. At sentencing, Mr. Cook continually referred to 
Defendant's inability to understand or recall any involvement in a crime, and used 
Defendant's neurological and cognitive injuries for mitigating factors, but never requested 
that the Court withdraw his plea of guilty. (Sentencing Pgs. 2-6) 
Mr. Medsker was ultimately sentenced to serve a term of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison for his plea of guilty to the third degree felony. The prison term was 
suspended and he was placed on probation with 120 days of home confinement. The 
Defendant now appeals based upon the following: 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court allowed Defendant to enter a plea of guilty without strictly 
complying with provisions of Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The 
trial court's failure to strictly comply with the rule constituted plain error because there 
was an obvious error, the trial court should have been aware of the error and the error 
was prejudicial to the Defendant. 
The Defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel when both of his attorney's failed to move to withdraw his plea. Each of his 
attorneys were aware that Defendant was incapable of understanding the elements of the 
charges, yet neither attorney moved to withdraw the plea. The record clearly shows that 
Defendant was acting solely on the advice of counsel when entering the plea and was 
without the understanding necessary to constitute a knowing and voluntary plea. The 
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errors by counsel were prejudicial to Defendant and Defendant should be afforded a new 
trial wherein he can have effective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11(E) WHILE 
TAKING DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
Despite Defendant's failure to move for a withdrawal of the plea of guilty, this 
court can review defendant's guilty pleas for plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580 (Ct. App. 1992). To Succeed on a claim of plain error, 
a defendant has the burden of showing "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful/1 State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998). 
In the case at bar it was obvious that the Defendant did not understand what he 
was doing and was only acting on advice of his attorney. Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure governs the taking of pleas. That rule states: 
11(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
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(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(Emphasis Added) 
The record clearly demonstrates that Defendant did not understand the nature and 
elements of the crime of possession of a controlled substance. The following exchange 
between the Court and Defendant reflect the Defendant's complete reliance on defense 
counsel's advice without an understanding of what was going on:2 
Court: I assume you understand what the States' evidence is so that you 
appreciate the negotiation that Mr. Boyle has prepared for you. 
Defendant: Yes. 
2
 It should be noted that the Defendant's waiver of his Preliminary Hearing 
and the actual Plea Hearing overlap. Defendant relies upon the fact that the Court was 
pursuing both the waiver and the plea at the same time in making this argument and that 
the court was considering more than just the record of the plea hearing, and was looking 
at the surrounding facts and circumstances as approved by the State of Utah in Salazar v. 
Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993). 
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Court: Do you feel good about that in light of what you believe the State's 
evidence to be? 
Defendant: I'm assuming it's correct, yes. 
Court: You understand that you have a right to have your day in court? 
Defendant: I'm just going with what he [Mr. Boyle] says. 
Court: And that's appropriate and that's why you hire a lawyer. But I also 
think that it's important for a client to always also exercise his own 
independent judgment based on what he believes the evidence is and, 
and to, you know, kind of think for yourself. Have you done that? 
Defendant: Well I can't, I can't really say what, I can't defend myself if that's... 
(Entry ofPleaPgs. 3-4) 
Defense counsel immediately interjected and offered a proffer of evidence that 
would support the plea at this point. The Court never returned to assess if the Defendant 
used his "independent judgment" in making his plea and continued on with the remainder 
of the plea hearing. The trial court's failure to assess the voluntariness of the Defendant's 
plea was clear error because he failed to strictly adhere to rule 11(e)(2) and find that the 
plea was voluntarily made. 
There have been numerous cases decided in the appellate courts of this jurisdiction 
relating to the taking of guilty pleas. Each case requires strict compliance with Rule 
11(e) and this Court has repeatedly overturned guilty pleas when the trial court failed to 
strictly comply with the rule. As held in State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 388 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. 2000), "it should have been obvious to the trial court that the 
requirements were never discussed with the Defendant on the record and that failure to do 
so constitutes plain error." (Citations omitted). 
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Based upon the extensive examination of the taking of pleas by the Courts in this 
jurisdiction, it should have been obvious to the trial court that an error was made. The 
Court's acceptance of the plea under those circumstances constitute plain error. 
The trial court's error was prejudicial to Defendant. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 
U.S. 637, 645, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976) the Supreme Court held: 
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to be entered against a 
defendant, solely on the consent of the defendant's agent—his lawyer. Our 
cases make absolutely clear that the choice, to plead guilty must be the 
defendant's: it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his plea 
and what it is that he waives when he pleads, Boy kin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, (1969); and it is on his admission that he is in fact guilty that his 
conviction will rest. Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, at 650 (Emphasis Added). 
In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that Mr. Medsker was acting solely on 
advice of his counsel, without any independent understanding of the charges he was 
pleading to. Since Defendant was without that understanding, this Court should remand 
this case back to the District Court to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY'S ADVISED HIM TO 
PLEAD GUILTY OF A CRIME HE HAD NO MEMORY OF 
AND FAILED TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
In the event that this Court finds that the trial court did not commit plain error by 
accepting the Defendant's plea, it should find that Defendant was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel at the plea hearing and at sentencing. Both of Defendant's 
defense attorneys were aware that Defendant was not capable of voluntarily entering a 
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plea and still advised Defendant to do so. Neither attorney moved to have the plea 
withdrawn despite the fact that they each proffered Defendant's limited capabilities to the 
trial court. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee persons 
charged with a criminal offense the right to effective assistance of counsel to assist in 
their defense. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1; Utah 
Const. Art. 1, Section 7; Utah Const. Art. 7, Section 12; See also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 667 at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (1990). Mr. Medsker was denied this constitutionally guaranteed right and; 
therefore, the Defendant's plea should be set aside and Defendant should be allowed to 
proceed with a defense to the charges. 
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant 
must show that (1) her counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) that there 
exists a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient conduct, the verdict would 
have been more favorable to the defendant. State v. Cummins, 829 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) 
Mr. Medsker was represented by two attorneys in the trial court. At the plea 
hearing his attorney was Michael J. Boyle and at the sentencing he was represented by 
Glen A. Cook. Defendant asserts that each of his trial attorneys acted deficiently 
requiring reversal of his conviction. 
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A. Ineffective Assistance by Michael Boyle 
Mr. Medsker entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance on December 18, 1998. It is obvious from the Defendant's statements at the 
Plea Hearing (as indicated in the above argument) that he did not enter his plea 
voluntarily. It is Defendant's position that Mr. Boyle acted deficiently when he advised 
Defendant to plead guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance when he 
knew that Defendant had no independent recollection of the events leading to his arrest 
for the charges and was not capable of making such a plea. 
Despite the obvious problems Mr. Medsker had with his cognitive abilities and the 
his lack of independent memory regarding the incident, Mr. Boyle recommended that he 
plead guilty to the charges. Mr. Boyle never requested that Mr. Medsker undergo any 
sort of psychological testing to determine if he was competent to enter a plea and advised 
the Defendant to enter the plea knowing that Mr. Medsker had suffered neurological and 
cognitive injuries in the accident. 
Mr. Medsker's incompetency to knowingly enter a plea is reflected in his inability 
to assist his counsel in his defense. Mr. Medsker made it perfectly clear to the court and 
his counsel that he was without the memory to state that he actually committed the crime 
that he was pleading to. (Entry of Plea P. 3) He also stated that he could not represent 
himself and was only acting on his attorney's advice. (Entry of Plea P. 4). 
A person is incompetent to proceed in a criminal action if he is suffering from a 
mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: (1) his inability to have a 
-13-
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him or of the punishment 
specified for the offense charged; or (2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to 
participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding. See U.C.A. §77-15-2 (1953 As Amended). 
Mr. Medsker was unable to actively participate in the proceedings against him and 
acted solely upon the advice of Mr. Boyle. Mr. Boyles' failure to adequately investigate 
the Defendant's mental capabilities prior to advising Defendant to enter a plea of guilty 
rendered his representation objectively deficient. Mr. Boyle was aware of the 
Defendant's limited abilities due to the accident; however, he still advised Mr. Medsker 
to plead guilty and interjected in the Court's colloquy with Defendant regarding his 
understanding of the proceedings instead of allowing the Court to see the Defendant's 
complete confusion. 
Defendant was prejudiced by counsel ineffective assistance of counsel and would 
have received a more favorable outcome had counsel acted appropriately. 
B. Ineffective Assistance by Glen A. Cook 
Mr. Cook's representation of the Defendant was objectively deficient when he 
failed to move for a withdrawal of the Defendant's plea of guilty and failed to do an 
adequate investigation into the case. The transcript clearly reflects that the Defendant did 
not make his plea knowingly and voluntarily as indicated above. As a result of the 
accident which instigated the criminal charges against Defendant, Mr. Medsker suffered 
neurological injuries and had difficulty with his cognitive abilities. 
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Although Mr. Cook used the Defendant's neurological injuries in argument for 
mitigation of sentencing, Mr. Cook never requested that Defendant's plea of guilty be 
withdrawn on that basis. Mr. Cook never requested that the Defendant be examined to 
determine whether or not he was even capable of giving a plea. Defense counsel openly 
admitted to the Court that he felt that Defendant had some "cognitive and neurological 
issues". Defense counsel also stated that he found some issues in "communicating rather 
simple ideas to him" and that sometimes he would say something and "will receive a stare 
and I have to repeat it again". (Sentencing Pg. 5). 
Despite Defendant's obvious problems understanding the legal system and the 
proceedings against him, Mr. Cook never investigated further to determine if Defendant's 
plea should be set aside due to his impairment. 
Mr. Cook's failure to adequately investigate the Defendant's neurological and 
cognitive problems is obviously deficient representation. As ruled in State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) "failure of counsel to adequately investigate... cannot fall 
within the 'wide range of professional assistance' referred to in Strickland." 
Absent the deficient representation given by Mr. Cook, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the Defendant would have prevailed on his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The confusion of the Defendant at the plea hearing negates the trial court's 
determination that the Defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea. Rule 11(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial 
court must determine that the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
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offense. State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1996). In addition 
to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of the crime, the trial court 
must determine that the defendant "'possesses an understanding of the law in relation to 
the facts'" for the defendant's plea to be "'truly voluntary."' State v. Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 22 L. 
Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166(1969)). 
It is obvious that the Defendant's neurological and cognitive impairments made it 
impossible for him to make a knowingly and voluntarily plea. Had Mr. Cook made a 
motion to withdraw the plea and have Defendant examined regarding his ability to enter 
the plea, the Defendant had a good chance of succeeding on his claim. However, he 
opted to use Mr. Medsker's impairment as a mitigating factor at sentencing rather than 
ensure that he voluntarily made a plea. 
Mr. Cook's failure to investigate the Defendant mental abilities resulted in a 
violation of the Defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon arguments set forth above, the Appellant's judgement and conviction 
should be overturned and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
wherein his constitutional rights shall be protected.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this M d $ of June, 2000. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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to roll 
P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
THE JUDGE: Are we ready with the 
Medsker matter? 
MR. POORMAN: I believe we are, Your 
Honor. I think Mr. Boyle is speaking with his 
client. Mr. Hamilton is here (short inaudible, 
no mic). 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, I'm ready 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, let's do it. 
(Other matters called). 
THE JUDGE: - - vs Todd Michael Medsker. 
MR. POORMAN: Your Honor, we have 
reached a resolution in this matter. 
THE JUDGE: Would you--
MR. POORMAN: It's my understanding 
that the defendant is going to waive his 
preliminary, preliminary hearing scheduled for 
today and at his arraignment would plead guilt to 
the third degree felony of possession of 
methamphetamine in exchange for which the State 
would move to dismiss the paraphernalia charge 
along with the DUI. The basis for this, Your 
Honor, is Mr. Medsker was involved in an 
automobile accident. He was 1ife- flighted to 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
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1 || the U of U, I believe--. 
2 II (End of Tape 98-40. Tape 98-41 turned on late, 
3 II portion of hearing not recorded.) 
4 THE JUDGE: You understand your right, 
5 your right to have a preliminary hearing, 
6 Mr. Medsker? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
8 THE JUDGE: Are you waiving that right 
9 today? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
11 THE JUDGE: You seem reluctant. Are 
12 you troubled with something? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: No. I just, I don't 
14 really remember a lot, you know, even leaving 
15 Boise. As far as anything else I just, I don't 
16 know, it's just-- I mean, just like the car 
17 wreck itself I don't, it's like it never happened 
18 to me. I just came to and--
19 THE JUDGE: I assume you understand 
20 what the State's evidence is so that you 
21 appreciate the negotiation that Mr. Boyle has 
22 II prepared for you. 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
24 II THE JUDGE: Do you feel good about that 
25 || in light of what you believe the State's evidence 
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1 to be? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: I'm assuming it's 
3 II correct . yes . 
4 THE JUDGE: You understand you have a 
5 right to have your day in court? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: I'm just going with 
7 what he says. 
8 THE JUDGE: And that's appropriate and 
9 that's why you hire a lawyer. But I also think 
10 that it's important for a client to always also 
11 exercise his own independent judgment based on 
12 what he believes the evidence is and, and to, you 
13 know, kind of think for yourself. Have you done 
14 that? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Well I can't, I can't 
16 really say what, I can't defend myself if 
17 that's--
18 MR. BOYLE: Maybe if I can maybe give 
19 the Court some--
20 II THE JUDGE: Maybe a proffer of 
21 || evidence? 
22 || MR. BOYLE: There's a-- The State 
23 || would, State would show that in regard to the 
24 || possession of controlled substance 
25 || methamphetamine that at the time he was taken to 
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1 || the University of Utah that in the process of 
2 || receiving medical, emergency medical treatment 
that either, I think it- was the statement of the 
4 II officer that the doctor asked him are you on 
5 || anything and at that time the, according to what 
6 || the officer told me that the doctor, excuse me, 
7 || that Mr. Medsker then handed him a baggy 
8 || containing methamphetamine . And that would be 
9 || the evidence that the State would present against 
1 0 II Mr. Medsker. 
11 MR, POORMAN: And, and the 
12 paraphernalia charge would stem from the fact 
13 that he had what was it eight, ten bottles of 
14 Minithins which contain a precursor for 
15 methamphetamine along with a lamp which I guess 
16 they cook out the--
17 MR, BOYLE: Generally they use it for 
18 purposes of (short inaudible, no mic) . 
19 MR. POORMAN: Yes. It's ephe--, 
2 0 ephedrine. 
21 MR. BOYLE: Yes. It's pseudoephedrine. 
22 II MR. POORMAN: Yes. That they remove 
23 || from the Minithins. 
24 II MR. BOYLE: There was also a pipe that 
25 || was found and located in the car as well. There 
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1 is some question as to who exactly, there is some 
2 1 guess question whether it was found in the 
3 II passenger's purse or whether it was found in the 
4 car itself . 
5 MR. POORMAN: And the DUI stemmed from 
6 the fact that the EMTs first on the scene 
7 detected on odor of an alcoholic beverage, that 
8 coupled with the fact of his possession of the 
9 methamphetamine led to the DUI charge. 
10 THE JUDGE: Was there a BAC taken? 
11 MR. BOYLE: There was a blood draw, 
12 Your Honor, indicating he had a lot of 
13 methamphetamine in the bloodstream. 
14 THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. Thank 
15 you. 
16 Beyond the plea to the third degree 
17 felony and the dismissal of the two Class B 
18 misdemeanors is there any other aspect of the 
19 negotiation? 
20 (I MR. POORMAN: The State is requesting 
21 || a, a PSI on this one, Your Honor. 
22 || THE JUDGE: Okay. 
23 II MR. BOYLE: We don't object on that 
24 request. 
25 II THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
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1 Is, is that the negotiation in your mind, 
2 Mr. Medsker? 
3 II THE DEPENDANT: Yes. It is, Your 
4 Honor. 
5 THE JUDGE: Do you feel pressured by 
6 anyone to enter a plea of guilty this morning? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
8 THE JUDGE: Okay. The Court will 
9 accept the waiver of the preliminary hearing. 
10 I'm going to ask you now some questions. I'd 
11 like you to listen carefully to these questions 
12 so that I can evaluate whether your plea is 
13 knowing and voluntary this morning. 
14 Do you appreciate first of all that 
15 under the law you're presumed to be innocent and 
16 that presumption remains with you until the State 
17 proves you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
19 THE JUDGE: Please be advised that you 
20 (I have the right to a speedy public jury trial and 
21 || to be represented by a lawyer at that trial. Do 
22 II you understand that right? 
23 II THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
24 || THE JUDGE: At trial you would also 
25 II have the right to cross examine the State's 
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1 witnesses, a right to subpoena your own witnesses 
2 to assist you with your defense, you'd have a 
3 II right to make a statement to the jury or your 
4 right to remain silent and thus put the State to 
5 the full burden of proving your guilt without any 
6 contribution from you. Do you understand that? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
8 THE JUDGE: Do you have any questions 
9 about that? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible 
11 response, no mic.) 
12 THE JUDGE: Do you understand that 
13 you're waiving all of these rights by pleading 
14 guilty this morning? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
16 THE JUDGE: Please be advised that any 
17 appeal that you file after today will be limited 
18 in scope because you've decided guilt for 
19 everyone. Do you understand that? 
20 II THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
21 || THE JUDGE: This plea of guilty to the 
22 || third degree felony carries a maximum penalty not 
23 || to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison and 
24 || not to exceed a $5,000 fine. I'm not saying I'm 
25 || going to impose that but that's your maximum 
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1 exposure. Do you understand that? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: (No audible response, 
3 II no mic) . 
4 THE JUDGE: I've heard a factual basis 
5 for the plea and the Court finds based on that 
6 factual basis or that proffer of evidence that 
7 there is a factual basis for the plea. 
8 Beyond that please be advised that in 
9 order to convict you of the third degree felony 
10 that the State would need to prove beyond a 
11 reasonable doubt that you knowingly and 
12 intentionally had in your possession a controlled 
13 substance methamphetamine, a Schedule 2 drug. 
14 Do you understand those elements? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
16 THE JUDGE: Do you understand that, 
17 that a plea of guilty is an admission of those 
18 elements? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: It's what? 
20 THE JUDGE: That you're, pleading 
2 1 II guilty you're admitting the elements that the 
22 || State would have to prove. Do you understand 
23 II that? 
24 II THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
25 || THE JUDGE: Before I accept your plea 
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1 do you feel a need for any reason to get further 
2 advice from Mr., Mr. Boyle? 
3 II THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible response, no 
4 mic). 
5 THE JUDGE: Okay. Are you satisfied 
6 with the advice that he has given you? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible response, no 
8 mic). 
9 THE JUDGE: Is there any statement in 
10 advance of plea? 
11 MR. BOYLE: No, Your Honor. 
12 THE JUDGE: Okay. To the charge then 
13 of possession of a controlled substance, a third 
14 degree felony, how do you plead? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
16 THE JUDGE: On motion of the State 
17 under the - -
18 MR. POORMAN: Move to dismiss the DUI 
19 and the possession of paraphernalia, Your Honor. 
20 II THE JUDGE: Motion is granted. The 
21 || Court finds that this is a knowing and voluntary 
22 || plea. You nonetheless have a right to make a 
23 || motion to withdraw this plea if it's made in 
24 || writing within 30 days from today and is 
25 || supported by good cause. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Sentencing Hearing 
1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S. 
2 MR. COOK: Judge, if we can call the 
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4 THE JUDGE: Yes. I was, you know, I 
5 was sitting here thinking to myself we need to 
6 call Medsker. 
7 MR. COOK: I knew you were, Judge. 
8 Mr. Medsker? 
9 (Discussion regarding other case.) 
10 I THE JUDGE: Now this is, is State of 
11 Utah versus Todd Michael Medsker. 
12 MR. COOK: Glen Cook on behalf of 
13 Mr. Medsker, Your Honor. It's set for 
14 sentencing. 
15 THE JUDGE: Yes. Go right ahead. 
16 MR. COOK: Thanks. The agent 
17 appropriately recommends limited jail, Judge, 
18 noting in my reading primarily as a mitigating 
19 factor the excessive hardship that would result 
20 to his daughter. I would also note that the 
21 guidelines support that. The guidelines call 
22 for probation (inaudible word, no mic) jail. 
23 The report correctly indicates he's employed. 
24 More importantly his employer is aware of this 
25 matter and has been apprised of it. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 I wanted to point out to the Judge that 
2 Mr. Medsker suffered rather severe injuries, 
3 that's why I provided the letter to you. I 
4 previously provided it to AP&P last week, or last 
5 month before they offered their report as well as 
6 a copy has been given to the prosecution. He 
7 was life- flighted to LDS. He as you can see has 
8 suffered neurological injuries. The bill I saw 
9 was approximately $28,000 for his own medical 
10 care. And I point this out not to invoke pity 
11 from you, Judge, not that you necessarily would 
12 give it, but rather to indicate that through his 
13 own actions he has suffered some consequences 
14 here and that's one of the things that we deal 
15 with in sentencing to make sure that the 
16 defendant suffers consequences. He has through 
17 his own actions and he understands that and he's 
18 accepting responsibility for that. 
19 He has lived in the same house for eight 
20 years. He's indicated he lives with his, his 
21 daughter, is a single parent. I've explained to 
22 him in very blunt terms what would happen to his 
23 daughter if he were to be imprisoned and 
24 explained to him that that is a distinct 
25 likelihood if he continues this course of 
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conduct. 
His addiction, Judge, is 
methamphetamine. And I don't think you'll argue 
with me when I state my experience is that it 
seems to be one of the most addictive drugs that 
we deal with. The marijuana in my experience 
makes them somewhat more stupid and has cognitive 
issues. But the methamphetamine, it's just it's 
so hard for them to overcome it. And that's not 
an excuse but it explains the need for treatment 
in this matter. 
The prior possession charges, one was 
methamphetamine, the other one was marijuana. 
The primary issues, Judge, I think are 
that he is employed which we don't always see, 
he's the sole emotional and financial support for 
his daughter. And I guess I'm making a plea on 
her behalf for his benefit to protect her. And 
he has through his own actions suffered serious 
consequences with financial, physical and mental 
repercussions to himself. 
We'd ask the Court to seriously consider 
home confinement or house arrest at his expense 
up in Aida County. This will allow him to 
continue his employment, continue in caring for 
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1 his daughter. Certainly in-home visits, 
2 urinalysis are appropriate. NA is appropriate 
3 II and he's going to engage in NA. He is not in a 
4 counseling program at this point. 
5 One of the issues I think that we need 
6 to be dealt with in counseling are some cognitive 
7 and neurological issues as well. In my dealings 
8 with him, while I'm not a mental health 
9 professional by any means, I found some issues in 
10 communicating rather simple ideas to him, we have 
11 to repeat them and explain them in different ways 
12 and sometimes I will say something and I will 
13 just receive a stare and I have to repeat it 
14 again. I think an example of this was seen in 
15 his difficulty in initially completing the 
16 paperwork AP&P gave him as seen in their letter 
17 to you previously. It took him a great amount 
18 of time. And he, he wasn't just dillydallying 
19 over it, he has real issues right now in dealing 
20 with that. I, I would suggest that counseling 
21 include some neurocognitive issues as well to 
22 help him through that. 
23 That would with be our input, Judge. 
24 Oh, I apologize. Just one other thing. 
25 Recognition of his wrongdoing. The report seems 
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somewhat equivocal to me. I've talked to him 
His points and, and I'll try to make them 
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amnestic he indicates for not only that day, he 
doesn't remember leaving Boise to make the 
trip. So he is not disputing that there were 
drugs in his system. He's aware there were 
drugs in his system, he's not disputing that in 
any way and he's taking the responsibility for 
that. The issue is he doesn't know what 
happened. It's almost in the nature of an 
Albert plea in a sense in indicating to the Court 
that he accepts responsibility but he's without 
memory for it. That he recognizes he has a drug 
problem, he's been candid about that with me and 
he's authorized me to represent that to the Court 
as well. 
THE JUDGE: Does the State wish to be 
heard? 
MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, the State 
would concur in the recommendations of the 
agency. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Medsker, you do accept 
the fact that you have a problem--
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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